<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Security on Alessandro Sangiorgi — GPU Performance Engineer</title><link>https://contact.alessandrosangiorgi.net/tags/security/</link><description>Recent content in Security on Alessandro Sangiorgi — GPU Performance Engineer</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 18 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://contact.alessandrosangiorgi.net/tags/security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>FLAG_MUTABLE PendingIntent in DeviceAsWebcam Allows Foreground Activity Hijack via fillIn() Injection</title><link>https://contact.alessandrosangiorgi.net/posts/deviceaswebcam-flag-mutable-pendingintent-activity-hijack/</link><pubDate>Sat, 18 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://contact.alessandrosangiorgi.net/posts/deviceaswebcam-flag-mutable-pendingintent-activity-hijack/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;I reported a vulnerability in AOSP&amp;rsquo;s &lt;code&gt;DeviceAsWebcam&lt;/code&gt; service where a &lt;code&gt;FLAG_MUTABLE&lt;/code&gt; PendingIntent is used as the foreground notification&amp;rsquo;s &lt;code&gt;contentIntent&lt;/code&gt;. An attacker app with user-granted &lt;code&gt;NotificationListenerService&lt;/code&gt; access can extract the PendingIntent, inject arbitrary intent fields via &lt;code&gt;fillIn()&lt;/code&gt;, and force-launch the system-UID &lt;code&gt;DeviceAsWebcamPreview&lt;/code&gt; activity in the foreground — overlapping whatever the user was doing. The report was submitted on &lt;strong&gt;March 19, 2026&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="the-vulnerable-code"&gt;The Vulnerable Code&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is in &lt;a href="https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/services/DeviceAsWebcam/+/refs/heads/main/interface/src/com/android/deviceaswebcam/DeviceAsWebcamFgService.java#134"&gt;&lt;code&gt;DeviceAsWebcamFgService.java&lt;/code&gt; (line 134)&lt;/a&gt;. The preview activity intent is created with only the component set — no action, no data, no extras, no flags, no categories:&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Blocking WiFi De-Auth Attacks in the Kernel with eBPF and XDP</title><link>https://contact.alessandrosangiorgi.net/posts/ebpf-xdp-wifi-deauth-defense/</link><pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://contact.alessandrosangiorgi.net/posts/ebpf-xdp-wifi-deauth-defense/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;802.11 de-authentication attacks are one of the oldest and cheapest WiFi denial-of-service techniques. An attacker sends forged de-auth management frames to disconnect clients from an access point — &lt;code&gt;aireplay-ng&lt;/code&gt; sends 128 per attack command (64 directed at the AP, 64 at the client). Despite being a known problem for over two decades, the main defense is still 802.11w (Protected Management Frames), which requires both AP and client support and still degrades under high-rate floods.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Intercepting Android's ManagedProvisioning: A PendingIntent Vulnerability in AOSP</title><link>https://contact.alessandrosangiorgi.net/posts/managedprovisioning-pendingintent-vulnerability/</link><pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://contact.alessandrosangiorgi.net/posts/managedprovisioning-pendingintent-vulnerability/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;I found and reported a vulnerability in Android&amp;rsquo;s &lt;code&gt;ManagedProvisioning&lt;/code&gt; component — the system app responsible for setting up enterprise-managed (work) profiles. The bug allows any unprivileged third-party app to intercept a privileged provisioning callback, leaking install timing, session metadata, and in some cases package details — all without any special permissions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Google acknowledged the report, logged it for potential remediation, and classified it as low severity. Here&amp;rsquo;s the full breakdown.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>